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Abstract 
Since the British “Brexit referendum” in 2016, tensions between ‘leave’ and ‘remain’ 
voters have been growing. Using a novel analytical approach based on the full 
distribution of responses rather than their arithmetic means, Study 1 (N=1,506) 
showed on average 90% of overlap among Leavers and Remainers across a range of 
important variables. Even on the variables that are commonly used to illustrate how 
Leavers and Remainers differ (e.g., prejudice against immigrants), the amount of 
overlap was larger than 50%. In Study 2 (N=206), we demonstrate the importance of 
focusing on similarities between groups: Presenting the full distribution of responses 
from Leavers and Remainers rather than their mean differences caused more accurate 
perceptions of the actual differences and similarities between both groups and higher 
perceived intergroup harmony. We conclude that similarities between Leavers and 
Remainers are substantial and that our proposed approach may help to de-escalate 
tensions between these and other groups. 
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Leavers and Remainers After the Brexit Referendum: More United Than 
Divided After All? 
In the “Brexit referendum” of June 2016, 52% of the British electorate voted 
that the United Kingdom (UK) should leave the European Union (EU). Since then, 
the tensions between those who voted leave (‘Leavers’) and those who voted remain 
(‘Remainers’) have been growing. Three years after the referendum, Brexit was still 
by far the single most important topic to British voters (YouGov, 2019). These 
tensions are exemplified within political parties and British society. The two largest 
parties in the UK, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, are quarrelling both 
between and within their parties about whether the UK should leave the EU and, if 
so, how (Adonis, 2019; Smith, 2017; Withers, 2019). Further, it has also been 
reported that Leavers and Remainers descend “into hyperbole and emotional 
invective against those they disagree with” (The Guardian, 2017; see also Gillett, 
2019). For example, Leavers see the need to defend themselves of not being racists 
(Hannan, 2016; Hill, 2016).  
Because of these tensions, politicians (e.g., Lucas, 2019; May, 2018) and 
NGOs (e.g., Amnesty International, 2016) have called “to focus on what unites us 
rather than what divides us” (Amnesty International, 2016). However, previous 
psychological research has usually tested for mean differences between Leavers and 
Remainers, making it unclear to what extent the groups actually share or do not 
share broad psychological tendencies such as values, needs, and attitudes. This 
neglect is problematic, because a better understanding of the psychological 
perspectives that Leavers and Remainers share would be an important starting point 
to reducing tensions between them. Further, it is unclear whether highlighting groups 
similarities would in fact help to overcome the “Brexit divide”.  
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The present research had three aims to address these issues. First, we aimed 
to replicate previous research examining mean differences among Leavers and 
Remainers on a range of important psychological variables. To test this aim, we used 
the default way of investigating mean differences between two groups (i.e., t-tests). 
This was important to get a better understanding of why people voted for leave or 
remain. Second, to provide a more balanced and detailed psychological profile of the 
groups, we used a novel approach to examine the amount of overlap between 
Leavers and Remainers on the same set of variables. Specifically, we tested whether 
the groups are more similar to each other than different. A final aim was to examine 
the practical implications of presenting information about the amount of actual 
overlap between groups. To achieve this aim, an experimental study tested whether a 
balanced portrayal of intergroup effects, rather than accentuating differences, is 
beneficial for perceptions of the research findings and for social cohesion in the 
general public, thus potentially informing social scientists about strategies to present 
their findings. To the best of our knowledge, the present research provides first 
evidence on the extent to which Leavers and Remainers are similar or different on a 
range of important psychological variables. The present research also provides 
evidence on broad practical implications by shedding more light onto whether 
presenting information about the actual overlap between groups improves intergroup 
attitudes. 
Previous Comparisons of Leavers and Remainers 
Despite the relatively short time frame since the Brexit referendum, 
researchers have already devoted considerable research attention to comparing 
Leavers and Remainers on a range of psychological and demographic variables. This 
research has mainly focused on the predictors of people’s voting decision. The 
findings revealed that the decision to vote ‘leave’ is associated with higher concerns 
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about immigration and multi-culturalism, British collective narcissism, 
Islamophobia, political conservatism, authoritarianism, distrust in the government, 
stronger British identity, social change insecurities, conspiracy beliefs, negative 
contact with EU immigrants, lower tolerance towards ambiguity, cognitive 
flexibility, agreeableness and openness personality traits, education, income, and 
increased age (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2017; 
Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis, Martin, & Rentfrow, 2018; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & 
Simão, 2017; Harper & Hogue, 2019; Hobolt, 2016; Lee, Morris, & Kemeny, 2018; 
Matti & Zhou, 2017; Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017; Swami, Barron, Weis, & 
Furnham, 2018; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018). In short, these findings 
suggest that Leavers are more likely to express negative views of immigrants, to be 
higher in conservatism and distrust in politicians, and to be older and less educated. 
For example, Meleady et al. (2017) found that negative contact with immigrants 
predicts having voted ‘leave’ and that prejudice against immigrants mediates this 
relation. In other words, people who have made negative experiences with 
immigrants and are prejudiced against them may have voted ‘leave’ to see fewer 
immigrants coming to the UK. Also, distrust in politicians predicts having voted 
‘leave’. This might also be the case because distrust in politicians was presumably 
intentionally been amplified by the leave campaign (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018). 
These findings on Brexit and psychological variables predicting people’s 
voting behaviour are consistent with the literature on Euroscepticism across the EU 
(de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Schuck & Vreese, 2008; Serricchio, Tsakatika, & 
Quaglia, 2013; Vasilopoulou & Wagner, 2017). For example, stronger concerns 
about immigration, stronger national identity, higher distrust in national institutions, 
and lower education predict both Euroscepticism across a range of European 
countries and having voted ‘leave’ in the Brexit referendum. 
6 
Running head: MORE UNITED THAN DIVIDED 
Similarities Between Groups are Large  
The research described above is important because it allows us to better 
understand the underlying motivations of the average person to vote ‘leave’ or 
‘remain.’ However, most of the time research findings generalise from statistically 
significant mean differences to group differences. For example, if the mean 
differences between two groups (e.g., Leavers vs Remainers), as established with t-
tests, reach conventional levels of statistical significance, the conclusion is 
commonly that group A is different from group B. However, this is often an 
oversimplification. If we examine the distribution of responses of all participants 
(e.g., in a histogram) rather than comparing the groups’ means, even variables 
showing large statistical mean differences reveal considerable levels of overlap or 
similarity between groups. While we assume that researchers are aware that groups 
may still overlap despite a significant t-test, this overlap is unmentioned in most 
cases. This neglect may be particularly problematic for the communication of 
research findings to the public. Statements such as “women are more susceptible to 
the side effects than men” may be understood by the public as implying that women 
and men “constitute different groups” (Maney, 2016, p. 2; see also Cimpian, 
Brandone, & Gelman, 2010). Indeed, research shows that lay people overestimate 
differences between groups when presented textually (e.g., “women are more 
anxious than men”; Hanel & Mehler, 2019) or graphically (e.g., barplots with 
restricted y-axes; Hanel, Maio, & Manstead, 2019). 
Thus, examining the overlap between two groups in the distribution of 
participant responses allows for a more balanced portrayal of research findings. This 
approach is more balanced because it provides information on both the amount of 
similarities (i.e., overlapping responses) and the amount of differences (i.e., non-
overlap) between the groups. In line with other researchers (Hanel et al., 2019; Hyde, 
7 
Running head: MORE UNITED THAN DIVIDED 
2005; Maney, 2016), we believe that it is important to balance the reporting of 
differences and similarities to provide a better understanding of scientific findings. 
Fortunately, commonly used effect sizes for mean differences such as 
Cohen’s d can be transformed into an “overlapping coefficient,” which is a measure 
of the overlap of two normal distributions (Inman & Bradley, 1989). More recently, 
Hanel, Maio, and Manstead (2019) argued that the overlapping coefficient can be 
understood as a measure of similarity and they relabelled it Percentages of Common 
Responses (PCR). The PCR expresses similarities and differences simultaneously. 
For example, a medium effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.50 translates into a PCR = 80, 
reflecting an 80% overlap of participants responses, whereas a low effect size of d = 
0.20 translates into a PCR of 92, reflecting a 92% overlap. Even a so-called large 
effect size of d = 0.80 (Cohen, 1992) still reflects a substantial amount of between-
group similarity (PCR = 69).  
To illustrate two ways of presenting a statistically significant mean 
difference, Figure 1 shows a significant meta-analytical mean difference between 
women and men on anxiety with an effect size of d = 0.29 (N > 100,000): Women 
are on average more anxious than men (Feingold, 1994). The top graph shows 
superimposed normal distributions, whereas the lower graph shows a typical barplot 
with standard errors. The normal distributions reflect the similarities and differences 
between the two groups. The barplots show only the means and the mean 
distributions (i.e., standard errors) that emphases the differences between the groups.  
---FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE--- 
Striking a Balance Between Examining Group Overlap and Mean Differences 
While we aim to show that it is important to highlight the amount of overlap 
between groups – particularly when highly polarised groups are considered – we also 
believe that examining mean differences is useful. This is because mean differences 
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shed more light on the underlying mechanism of why people decided to vote ‘leave’ 
or ‘remain’. In other words, mean differences allow us to understand what predicts 
people’s voting decision. Hence, in the present research we wish to advocate a 
simultaneous focus on overlap indices and mean differences between Leavers and 
Remainers. This approach may provide a more balanced portrayal of the findings. 
For example, the statement “Leavers value security more than Remainers” is likely to 
be an oversimplification based on group mean comparisons: Not all Leavers will 
value security more than Remainers, thereby masking the similarities between groups 
(cf. Maney, 2016). Instead, we suggest that presenting effect sizes that reflect overlap 
in addition to effect sizes that reflect mean differences improve comprehension 
(Hanel et al., 2019). To the best of our knowledge, the present research is the first 
empirical attempt to balance this simultaneous interpretation of the group distribution 
and the mean distribution.  
Previous research has recognised the importance of examining similarities 
between opposing groups (e.g., van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015; 
Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019). However, these studies operationalised 
similarities as a lack of significant mean differences, often supplemented by 
Bayesian analysis, or by U-shaped relations between political attitudes and various 
dependent variables such as negative emotions. While Bayesian analysis or 
equivalence testing (Hauck & Anderson, 1984) focus, to put it simply, on the 
difference between means, our approach considers the overlap and non-overlap 
between all responses.  
Aims of the Present Research 
The present research had three broad aims. First, Study 1 aimed to replicate 
previous evidence examining why people may decided to vote ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ 
(e.g., prejudice, identity), and extend this evidence by considering novel links with a 
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broader range of psychological variables. To do so, we tested the groups’ mean 
differences on a range of variables (see Tables 2-4). Based on previous evidence, we 
expected that Leavers and Remainers would reveal mean differences on prejudice, 
British identity, and need for cognition. Specifically, we hypothesised that Leavers 
would on average show higher levels of prejudice against immigrants than 
Remainers (e.g., Hobolt, 2016; Matti & Zhou, 2017; Meleady et al., 2017; Swami et 
al., 2018). Given that prejudice against immigrants is closely related to perceived 
competition for resources (i.e., zero-sum beliefs; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998), we further predict that 
Leavers hold higher zero-sum beliefs on average than Remainers. Leavers should 
also on average show higher levels of British identification than Remainers because 
national identity is linked with lower support for multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2009) 
and staying in the EU would imply more multiculturalism. We also hypothesised that 
Remainers would on average score higher on need for cognition than Leavers. Need 
for cognition is defined as the tendency to seek out and enjoy thinking, which is 
conceptually related to cognitive flexibility (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Previous 
research has found that Remainers score higher on measures of cognitive flexibility 
(Zmigrod et al., 2018).  
In addition to replicating previous evidence, we aimed to expand it by 
examining the underlying motivations of Leavers and Remainers. Specifically, we 
aimed to test the role of human values. Human values are among the most 
fundamental psychological constructs because of their function as trans-situational 
life-guiding principles (Maio, 2016; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Examining 
human values is particularly important in the context of the Brexit referendum. This 
is because their abstract nature enables them to be used as markers of common, 
shared ideals facilitating intergroup relations. A better understanding of the extent to 
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which Leavers and Remainers share certain values may hence be an important first 
step towards focusing on what unites rather than divides them. More specifically, 
values have also been shown to predict voting decisions beyond influences of 
personality traits (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006) 
and considerations of economic inequality (Kaufmann, 2016). The present research 
extends this literature in important ways by comparing Leavers and Remainers on 
human values. 
The predominant value model in psychology distinguishes between ten types 
(Schwartz, 1992): Security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, and power. Based on the literature, 
we hypothesised that security, conformity, and tradition would on average be valued 
more by Leavers. This is because these values have been linked with conservatism 
(Meleady et al., 2017; Schwartz, 1992), authoritarianism (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & 
Kielmann, 2005), negative attitudes towards immigrants (Davidov, Meulemann, 
Schwartz, & Schmidt, 2014), and voting for right-wing parties (Caprara et al., 2006, 
2017). In contrast, Remain voters may on average place higher importance on 
universalism because the motivational goal of universalism is to be understanding 
and tolerant towards all people (Schwartz, 1992). Therefore it is not surprising that 
universalism predicts voting for left-wing parties (Caprara et al., 2006, 2017). We 
did not make any predictions about the other six value types of Schwartz’s (1992) 
model. This may seem surprising for self-direction because it is (weakly) associated 
with voting for left-wing parties (Caprara et al., 2006). Further, remaining in the EU 
would allow British citizens to travel and work more freely, thus serving the need for 
autonomy that underlies self-direction. However, the leave campaign was built 
explicitly on self-direction with slogans such as “taking back control.” Further, the 
moral foundation “personal liberty” was on average higher among Leavers and is 
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conceptually relevant to self-direction (Harper & Hogue, 2019). Given these 
conflicting associations, we were agnostic about the role of self-direction in 
predicting people’s voting decision. 
We also investigated mean differences in perceptions of the values of people 
from their city or country. Previous research has shown an interesting discrepancy 
between people’s own values and their perceptions of others’ values (Hanel et al., 
2018). For example, while around 75% of people attached greater importance to 
universalism (e.g., equality) and benevolence (e.g., helpfulness) than to power (e.g., 
wealth) and achievement (e.g., success), 75% of people also believed that others 
value power and achievement more than universalism and benevolence. The 
perception of other people’s values can have important implications. For example, 
perceiving other people to value more benevolence and universalism is positively 
correlated with various measures of civic engagement such as voting (Sanderson et 
al., 2019). Previous research suggested that perception asymmetries exist across the 
political spectrum (Ditto et al., 2019). We therefore did not expect significant mean 
differences for perceived values.  
Beyond values, we also hypothesised that Remainers are on average more 
likely to support devolution (decentralisation). Previous research found that 
conservatism was on average higher among Leavers (e.g., Meleady et al., 2017) and 
devolution challenges the conservative idea of a powerful national state with an 
influential national parliament in London. 
Second, to provide a more balanced and detailed picture of how Leavers and 
Remainers compare, Study 1 tested the degree of overlap between these groups on 
the same set of variables. We expected the amount of similarities on all variables to 
be larger than the amount of differences (i.e., similarities > 50%), because we 
considered it unlikely that for many variables the mean difference would exceed d = 
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1.34. This translates into PCR = 50 (i.e., 50% or less similarities); the average effect 
size in social psychology is d = 0.43 (Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). We 
first considered variables for which larger mean differences among Leavers and 
Remainers can be expected based on past evidence, including prejudice against 
immigrants, British identity, and potentially human values. Including these variables 
provided a stringent test for our hypothesis that the two groups are more similar to 
each other than different. In addition, we explored the amount of overlap between 
Leavers and Remainers for all additional variables which have not previously been 
linked with the decision to vote leave or remain. These variables were included 
because of their relevance to important societal and personal outcomes such as social 
cohesion (e.g., civic engagement) and well-being (e.g., life satisfaction). We also 
included this large range of variables without a priori links to the decision to vote 
‘leave’ or ‘remain’ to avoid a specific form of publication bias: Fiedler (2011) argued 
that only including variables in (quasi-) experimental designs for which mean 
differences are expected, is a form of publication bias towards differences that is not 
often acknowledged. Despite their exploratory nature, the relevance of these 
variables to social cohesion and well-being makes it important to test whether 
Leavers and Remainers show relatively high or low levels of overlap on them. For 
example, if both groups showed high overlap in civic engagement, this would 
indicate that both groups care about the thriving of their community to the same 
extent (Doolittle & Faul, 2013). 
Finally, Study 2 tested the practical implications of displaying the actual 
degree of overlap between Leavers and Remainers rather than simplifying how these 
groups compare by reporting only the mean differences. To do so, we presented key 
findings from Study 1 in an experimental design by either highlighting the overlap 
between groups in superimposed normal distributions or the mean differences 
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between groups in standard barplots. Subsequently, we assessed participants’ 
perceptions of the findings and of the other respective group.  
Highlighting how Leavers and Remainers overlap may have a range of 
positive outcomes on intergroup harmony: While a focus on only the mean 
differences between groups may inadvertently increase tensions, emphasising 
similarities could promote intergroup harmony. This is because it may be more 
difficult to discriminate against an out-group when the similarities between the 
groups are apparent. Indeed, there is an extensive body of literature showing that 
similarity fosters more positive attitudes and behavioural intentions (Byrne, 1961; 
Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008; Pilkington & Lydon, 1997). For example, 
Brown and Abrams (1986) found that pupils liked and intended to cooperate with 
children from another school more when they were described as more similar. The 
notion that similarity fosters higher intergroup attitudes may be derived from social 
identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the common ingroup identity model 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Social identity theory assumes that people categorise 
others into in- and outgroups to attain a positive identity. If the distinction between 
the in- and outgroup is recategorised and people start to see themselves more as one 
group rather than two separate groups due to the expectedly high degrees of overlap, 
prejudice may be reduced ( Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; see also social identity 
complexity theory, Roccas & Brewer, 2002). In other words, by highlighting 
similarities, the distinction between the in- and outgroup may become blurred, 
resulting in more positive intergroup attitudes. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, previously employed manipulations 
of similarity (vs differences) involved providing different information to participants. 
For instance, Brown and Abrams (1986) manipulated the favourite school subjects of 
the outgroup to be either congruent or incongruent with the favourite subjects of the 
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pupils. In contrast, our approach uses the same variables and the same information. 
Specifically, we either highlighted similarities or differences to test whether there are 
costs of the currently predominant way of presenting research findings which 
highlights mean differences. We expected that presenting the actual overlap among 
groups would improve intergroup attitudes. While Study 2 focuses on Leavers and 
Remainers, we expect that the practical implications of using a balanced portrayal of 
research findings should generalise to other polarised groups (e.g., Republicans vs 
Democrats in the US). 
All materials as well as the datasets for samples 2 and 3 of Study 1 (the 
authors do not own the data of sample 1 but are allowed to publish summary 
statistics), and Study 2 can be found on https://osf.io/q97mv/. Ethical approval was 
obtained from the respective psychology ethics committee at the two British 
universities where the research was conducted. 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested mean differences between Leavers and Remainers and the 
amount of overlap among them on a wide range of psychological variables across 
three samples. To provide a clear structure, we primarily focused on the broad 
picture of mean differences and overlap across all variables and described only the 
variables that we expected to be relevant in the context of Brexit in more detail (see 
Online Supplemental Materials for details).  
Study 1 collapsed three independent cross-sectional studies (from now 
onwards: Samples 1-3). Across the three samples, we included variables which past 
evidence has found to be relevant to the Brexit vote (e.g., prejudice), novel variables 
that we expected to be relevant (e.g., human values), and variables that are relevant 
to important societal and personal outcomes (e.g., civic engagement). Specifically, 
given the novelty and relevance of human values in a Brexit context, all three 
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samples examined human values, allowing us to examine whether the findings 
replicate across three samples. See Table 1 for an overview of the variables included 
in Study 1. All data were collected in spring 2017, roughly around one year after the 
Brexit referendum. 
--- Table 1 around here --- 
Method 
Participants. We recruited three samples online. We aimed to recruit at least 
150 participants per sample to obtain fairly accurate estimates of effect sizes. 
Sensitivity analysis revealed that our sample sizes in Study 1 were sufficient to detect 
with a power of .80 effects of d = 0.16 (sample 1, N = 960), d = 0.24 (sample 2, N = 
440), and d = 0.46 (sample 3, N = 126). Sample 1 consisted of 1,184 participants, of 
which 461 participants identified as Leavers, 479 as Remainers (452 women, 486 
men, two preferred not to say) from the Greater Manchester area and who were 
selected to be representative. Eighty-nine participants were aged 18-24, 164 were 
aged 25-34, 159 were aged 35-44, 165 were aged 45-54, 144 were aged 55-64, 193 
were aged 65-74, 26 were aged 75+, and two preferred not to say. The data was 
collected in May 2017. 
Sample 2 consisted of 482 participants, of which 183 identified as Leavers 
and 257 as Remainers (239 women, 200 men, one preferred not to say; Mage = 39.43, 
SD = 12.33). Sample 2 completed two parts of the survey. The first part was 
completed within three days before the UK general election (8 June 2017) and the 
second part was completed within three days after the election. The second part was 
completed by 434 participants.  
Sample 3 consisted of 143 participants, of which 50 identified as Leavers and 
76 as Remainers (66 women, 60 men; Mage = 39.01, SD = 14.30). Sample 3 
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completed two parts of the survey. The study was conducted approximately 2 weeks 
before the UK general election in June 2017.  
Sample 1 materials.  
Brexit vote. We asked participants how they voted in the Brexit referendum 
(i.e., “remain”, “leave”, “prefer not to say”).  
Values. Participants completed the 21-item Portrait Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ; Schwartz et al., 2001). This questionnaire presents participants with 21 brief 
descriptions, each portraying a person as giving importance to one of Schwartz’s ten 
values (Schwartz, 1992). For instance, the description “It is important to him/her to 
be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things” reflects the value 
power. Participants answered on a scale from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much 
like me) how similar the person described is to themselves. Subsequently, 
participants completed a similar 21-item PVQ, with the difference that they indicated 
to what extent a described person is like a typical person living in Greater 
Manchester. For instance, the description “It is important to him/her to be rich. 
He/she wants to have a lot of money and expensive things” was answered on a scale 
from 1 (not at all like a typical person living in Greater Manchester) to 6 (very much 
like a typical person living in Greater Manchester).  
Devolution. We assessed participants’ views on devolution to a local 
government in Greater Manchester by asking “Do you think that having a mayor of 
Greater Manchester will be a good thing or a bad thing for Greater Manchester?” and 
“Do you think that giving more decision-making powers on issues such as tax, 
education, and policing is a good thing or a bad thing for local areas more 
generally?” which they answered on a scale from 1 (a very bad thing) to 5 (a very 
good thing). The items on devolution correlated highly with each other, r(1184)=.66, 
and were hence combined to a composite score.  
17 
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Sample 2 materials (pre-election). 
Brexit vote. We asked participants how they voted in the Brexit referendum 
(i.e., “remain”, “leave”, “not eligible to vote”, “decided not to vote”, “don’t 
remember”, “prefer not to say”).  
Values. Own and perceived values were again measured with the PVQ-21, as 
in sample 1. We measured own and perceived human values again after the election, 
but we will only report the responses of time 1 because of the larger sample (using 
the values data from time 2 did not change the pattern of results, given the high 
correlation between both measure moments, rs > .62, and previous evidence for the 
stability of values, see Schwartz et al., 2001). 
Need for cognition. Need for cognition was measured with the 18-item need 
for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Example items include “The 
notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me” and “Thinking is not my idea of 
fun” (reversed coded). Responses were given on a response scale ranging from 1 
(extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely characteristic of me; α = .91).  
British identity. British identity was measured with the 4-item satisfaction 
subscale of the in-group identification scale of Leach et al. (2008b). Example items 
include “I am glad to be British” and “It is pleasant to be British”. Responses were 
given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; α = .95).  
Sample 2 materials (post-election).  
Brexit attitudes. Specific attitudes towards Brexit were measured by asking 
how much participants supported each of the following scenarios: “Leave the EU, 
leave the single market and stop free movement of labour” (recoded), “Leave the EU, 
but stay in the single market and keep free movement of labour”, “Stay in the EU”. 
Responses were given on a scale from 1 (don't support this option at all) to 7 
(support this option very much; α = .79). We used this measure to confirm that the 
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Brexit vote (i.e., leave vs remain) was still a meaningful distinction approximately 
one year after the referendum. That is, we wished to test whether Leavers are still 
clearly more in favour of Brexit than Remainers. 
Sample 3 materials.  
Brexit vote. We asked participants how they voted in the Brexit referendum 
(i.e., “remain”, “leave”, “not eligible to vote”, “prefer not to say”). 
Human values. We assessed participants’ values using the 10-item TiVi 
measure (Sandy, Gosling, Schwartz, & Koelkebeck, 2017). This measure presents 
ten personal statements about the importance of each of Schwartz’s ten value types 
(Schwartz, 1992), and we asked participants to indicate how strongly they agree with 
each statement on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).  
Identification with being British. Participants completed the In-group 
Identification scale (Leach et al., 2008a). The scale contains 14 statements including 
“I feel a bond with British people” and “The fact that I am British is an important 
part of my identity” and participants indicated to what extent they agreed with these 
statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The data favoured a 
single-factor solution and averaging across all 14 items yielded a reliable 
identification score (α = .91). 
Political orientation. Next, we asked how attached they consider themselves 
to the Labour party, the Conservative party, and the Liberal Democrats. Further, we 
asked how interested they are in British politics on scales from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much). Additionally, participants indicated how they would describe their 
political views on a scale from 1 (liberal) to 10 (conservative). 
Prejudice. We measured participants’ prejudice towards immigrants with the 
blatant and subtle prejudice scale (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Participants 
responded to 20 statements including “Immigrants have jobs that British people 
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should have” in a random order on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Although the items are usually combined to form the two factors blatant and 
subtle prejudice, the data favoured a one-factor structure which showed very good 
internal consistency (α = .94). We therefore combined all items to a single prejudice 
score. 
Zero-sum beliefs. In addition, we assessed perceived competition with each 
group using Esses et al.’s (1998) zero-sum beliefs measure. This measure presents 14 
items (e.g., “when immigrants make economic gains, British people already living 
here lose out economically”) which were answered on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items loaded on one common factor and showed 
high internal reliability (α = .98). 
Demographics. Finally, we asked participants what their gross household 
income was, ranging from 1 (under £5,000 per year) to 15 (more than £150,000 per 
year), and we asked participants for the highest level of completed education, 
ranging from 1 (no schooling completed) to 7 (postgraduate education).  
Results 
To analyse the data, we first performed several “manipulation checks”, tested 
for mean differences, and finally computed the similarities between Leavers and 
Remainers across all variables (e.g., values, British identity, prejudice).   
First, we tested whether the distinction between Leavers and Remainers was 
still politically meaningful approximately one year after the Brexit referendum. 
Leavers were still more favourable towards Brexit than Remainers (t[302.50] = 
26.29, p < .001, PCR = 17, d = 2.77, see Table 3), and Leavers on average indicated 
to be more conservative, more attached to the Conservative Party, and less attached 
to the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats than Remainers (Table 4).  
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Next, we performed a series of analyses of covariance with the Brexit vote as 
between-subject factor, age and gender as covariates, and the constructs listed in 
Tables 2-4 as dependent variables. As controlling for age and gender did not change 
the pattern of results, we focused on pairwise comparisons and Welsh’s t-tests 
without covariates because this allowed us to compute the PCR. The results are listed 
in Tables 2-4 for each of the three samples. To reduce the likelihood of false-positive 
findings because of the large number of dependent variables, we only interpreted 
findings with p < .001. 
Mean differences. There were several mean differences between Leavers and 
Remainers. Consistent with past evidence, Leavers scored higher on British identity, 
prejudice, and zero-sum beliefs, and reported a lower need for cognition and a lower 
level of education than Remainers (see Tables 3 and 4).  
In addition, we extended this evidence by showing that Leavers valued 
security and tradition more, and universalism less than Remainers in samples 1 and 
2. In sample 3, the mean differences for human values were in the same direction but 
only reached statistical significance for universalism (Tables 2-4). Remainers 
reported on average higher civic engagement, more support for devolution, and 
higher active coping (i.e., political engagement; Tables 2 and 3). In addition, 
Remainers reported higher voting intention in the Greater Manchester election, and 
higher social and environmental concerns (Tables S1-S3). 
Overlap. However, as predicted, the amount of similarities was substantial. 
The average PCR across all variables was 94.54 (range = 86-100) in sample 1, 89.41 
(range = 17-100) in sample 2, and 83.36 (range = 51-100) in sample 3. Attitudes 
towards Brexit (PCR = 17) in sample 2, and prejudice (PCR = 51) and zero-sum 
beliefs (PCR = 52) in sample 3 showed the lowest amounts of similarity between 
Leavers and Remainers. 
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---TABLEs 2-4 AROUND HERE--- 
Study 2 
Study 1 has consistently shown that while there are significant mean 
differences between Leavers and Remainers on a range of psychological outcomes 
including human values, British identity, and prejudice against immigrants, Leavers 
and Remainers are more similar to each other than they are different. In Study 2, we 
aimed to test the practical importance of highlighting these actual similarities 
compared to highlighting mean differences. To do so, we presented key findings 
from Study 1 and either highlighted the similarities between Leavers and Remainers 
in superimposed normal distributions or the mean differences in barplots. Consistent 
with our advocated balanced approach, we use effect sizes that reflect mean 
differences between conditions (i.e., Cohen’s d) and effect sizes that reflect overlap 
(i.e., PCR) when presenting our findings. We focused on four variables that revealed 
reliable mean differences. We consider these variables as highly relevant to the 
public discussions surrounding the Brexit vote: Security values, universalism values, 
British identity, and prejudice against immigrants. Subsequently, we assessed 
perception of intergroup harmony and motivations and attitudes towards the other 
respective group (i.e., Leavers or Remainers).  
As discussed before, to the best of our knowledge previous research 
examining similarity effects on attitudes has presented different information to 
participants that either emphasised similarities or differences (e.g., Brewer & Silver, 
1978; Brown & Abrams, 1986; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; for an exception see 
Hanel et al., 2019). In contrast, our approach uses the same variables and the same 
information, but it either highlights the overlap or mean differences among Leavers 
and Remainers. 
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Method 
Participants. Based on relevant previous research (Hanel et al., 2019), we 
expected a medium-to-large effect size of d = 0.65 for the effect of highlighting 
either the overlap or mean differences between Leavers and Remainers. A power 
analysis revealed that a sample size of 52 participants for each cell would be required 
for a power of .95 (directed hypothesis). In total, 206 people completed the survey 
(Mage = 37.53, SD = 12.17, 146 women). Sixty-six participants voted ‘leave’ in the 
2016 Brexit referendum, 113 ‘remain’, and 26 decided not to vote (one missing 
value). Participants were recruited via a paid online platform, Prolific Academic. The 
data was collected in September 2017. 
Materials and Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to an 
overlap or mean differences condition. In the overlap condition, participants were 
presented with four superimposed normal distributions, whereas in the mean 
differences condition, participants saw four barplots which included standard errors 
and a restricted y-axis range (Figure 2). These plots showed how Leavers and 
Remainers compared on four variables that revealed reliable mean differences in 
Study 1: Security values, universalism values, British identity, and prejudice (which 
was rephrased and recoded as feelings towards immigrants to avoid the more socially 
sensitive term “prejudice”). We chose superimposed normal distributions to display 
overlap between Leavers and Remainers because they were rated as more 
comprehensible compared to superimposed histograms (Hanel et al., 2019). To 
display mean differences, we used barplots because we consider them among the 
most common ways psychological researchers display their findings. In both 
conditions, all four graphs were presented together. To create the graphs, we used 
Study 1 data from sample 1 for security and universalism, and from sample 3 for 
British identity and prejudice.  
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---FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE--- 
Participants in both conditions were informed that they would “be asked to 
rate the extent to which graphical information reflects differences and similarities 
between groups of people.” Then, we informed them that all the figures we presented 
were based on actual data from previous scientific studies - that is, “the data you will 
see is [sic!] real” (emphasis was in bold). Specifically, participants were informed 
that they “will see the responses of people who voted leave (“Leavers”) and remain 
(“Remainers”) in the Brexit referendum in June 2016. Please take a close look at the 
figure(s) before responding to questions.” Next, we shortly described the graphs and 
variables (e.g., “All respondents were asked to rate the importance of security (e.g., 
family security, social order) and universalism (e.g., broad-mindedness, equality) on 
a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 6 (very important).”  
After the four graphs were presented, all participants responded to the same 
five items on a slider measure ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much). The 
five items were (1) “How similar are Leavers and Remainers overall?”; (2) “How 
easily do you think Leavers and Remainers can get along with each other?”; (3) 
“How motivated are you to engage in a discussion with someone who voted in the 
Brexit referendum for the opposite outcome than you did?”; (4) “How favourable do 
you evaluate the people in general who voted for the opposite outcome than you did 
in the Brexit referendum?”; and (5) “How similar are Leavers and Remainers in 
terms of human values, British identity, and feelings towards immigrants?” This 
study was collected together with other data unrelated to the present project 
(participants completed around 150 items concerning their attitudes towards babies, 
toddlers, children, and teenagers). 
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Results 
To analyse the data, we first tested for potential moderators before we 
performed a series of between-subject comparisons to test whether the presentation 
mode of Study 1 findings influenced intergroup perceptions and attitudes. 
Moderators. First, we tested whether the Brexit vote (leave vs remain) would 
interact with the presentation mode (overlap vs mean differences) on the five 
dependent variables. None of the interactions of the two-way ANOVAs were 
significant (all Fs < 1.41; ps > .24). Also, including age and gender as covariates did 
not affect the pattern of results. We therefore collapsed across the Brexit vote, age, 
and gender, and focused on the pairwise comparisons between presentation modes in 
the next step. 
Mode of presentation. The means of highlighting overlap or mean 
differences were all in the expected direction, with three of the five mean 
comparisons reaching significance (Table 5, see also Figure S2 in the Online 
Supplemental Materials). Participants in the overlap condition perceived Leavers and 
Remainers to be more similar compared to participants in the mean differences 
condition. Additionally, participants in the overlap condition were more likely than 
participants in the mean differences condition to believe that both groups could 
easily get along. However, the motivation to engage in direct contact with members 
of the other group and favourability towards the other group did not differ 
significantly between conditions.  
---TABLE 5 AROUND HERE--- 
General Discussion 
It has been claimed that the Brexit referendum of June 2016 has revealed a 
divided, rather than a United Kingdom (e.g., Gillett, 2019; Hobolt, 2016; 
Vasilopoulou & Talving, 2019), with tensions growing among those who voted 
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‘leave’ (‘Leavers’) and those who voted ‘remain’ (‘Remainers’) (Fieldhouse & 
Prosser, 2017). The present research supports this claim by showing that one year 
after the referendum, Leavers and Remainers are still split over the Brexit vote and 
their general political orientation. Consistent with the literature (Hobolt, 2016; Matti 
& Zhou, 2017; Meleady et al., 2017; Swami et al., 2018), we found that Leavers on 
average have a stronger in-group identification and are more sceptical towards 
immigrants. In addition, Leavers valued security and tradition more and universalism 
less than Remainers. Finally, we also presented novel evidence that Remainers are on 
average more concerned about various social and environmental issues. Remainers 
find it more important to contribute to their community, are more motivated to 
engage in and enjoy thinking than Leavers. Together, these mean differences may 
help explain people’s voting decisions. Leavers attach on average greater importance 
to conservative principles such as security and tradition, which they may believe are 
better promoted outside of the European Union. In contrast, Remainers attach on 
average greater importance to the welfare of all people, social and environmental 
issues, and to their community. These findings suggest that Remainers are more 
likely to believe that both their own community and society at large benefit from 
close cooperation within the European Union. Further, it may be suggested that 
Remainers gave their vote more thought based on the finding that Remainers 
reported to enjoy thinking more. This is a provocative finding and it would be fruitful 
for future research to examine this mechanism in greater detail. 
Despite these reliable mean differences, the average similarity between 
Leavers and Remainers was approximately 90% across all variables. Even for 
prejudice towards immigrants, the variable that showed by far the largest mean 
difference, the amount of similarity between both groups was still substantial with 
51%. The similarities for other variables that are often mentioned as showcasing 
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important differences between Leavers and Remainers such as tradition values, were 
with close to 90% even more substantial. Hence, anecdotal evidence as reported in 
the Introduction that “Leavers are racists” or “Leavers are very traditional” is clearly 
exaggerated. Although Leavers had on average a higher level of prejudice towards 
immigrants, more than half of the Remainers had a comparable level of prejudice. 
Similarly, statements that Leavers are more traditional need to be handled with 
caution. Almost nine in ten Remainers valued tradition as much as Leavers. In 
contrast to our balanced approach, the common approach of focusing on mean 
differences between groups ignores these relatively large similarities. This may 
indirectly contribute to social tensions and polarisations between groups (e.g., 
through hypothetical claims such as “even research shows that Leavers are more 
racist”). This is likely to be the case not only for Leavers and Remainers but may be 
true in various contexts that involve polarised groups, such as Republicans and 
Democrats in the US (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018), unionists and separatists in 
Catalonia (Muro & Vlaskamp, 2016), and East Germans and West Germans 
(Jiménez, 2015). Given the social and political importance such research findings, 
we recommend a more balanced approach of reporting differences and similarities 
between groups. 
In fact, Study 2 found that presenting mean differences – the default way how 
scientific findings are reported – leads to an underestimation of similarities between 
groups and to lower perceived harmony between Leavers and Remainers, compared 
to presenting the actual degree of overlap between groups. This finding is broadly 
consistent with the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The 
model suggests that highlighting the actual overlap between groups may lead 
participants to recategorise their own group and the outgroup as a superordinate 
common ingroup, thereby disbanding intergroup boundaries and increasing perceived 
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intergroup harmony. The finding is also broadly consistent with previous research 
showing that highlighting similarities improves attitudes (e.g., Brown & Abrams, 
1986). Importantly, however, the present research demonstrates this effect by 
presenting the same information in different ways, either highlighting mean 
differences or highlighting overlap between the groups. 
However, contrary to our expectations, we did not find significant mean 
differences in Study 2 on attitudes and the motivation to engage with the other group. 
This might be because our manipulation was only presented once. Attitudes and 
motivation towards another group may be too robust to be overridden by a one-shot 
informational manipulation. This may be particularly the case in the context of a hot 
topic such as Brexit, where people’s stance towards the other group may be based on 
strong feelings, beliefs, and resistance. Future research may benefit from using a 
more extensive manipulation. For instance, participants could debate either 
similarities or differences between Leavers and Remainers. Future research could 
also examine the benefits of a balanced portrayal of findings for other polarised 
groups (e.g., Republicans vs Democrats in the US). 
The relatively large amount of similarities might seem uncommon and 
surprising at a first glance because most published research findings in psychology 
focus on differences (Fanelli, 2010; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). However, 
large similarities between groups of individuals are well-supported throughout the 
social sciences. For example, almost all countries signed the universal declaration of 
human rights and are part of the international police organisation. This reflects a 
shared understanding of what is right and wrong (Bobbio, 1996). Further, data from 
more than 50 countries suggests that the hierarchy of human values is universal 
(Schwartz & Bardi, 2001): Benevolence values are most important in nearly all 
countries, whereas power values are generally least important.  
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Conclusion. Across three samples we found reliable mean differences 
between Leavers and Remainers, but also that for most psychological variables the 
similarities were substantial and strongly outweighed the differences. By 
highlighting these similarities, the present research fostered a more accurate 
perception of the research findings and higher perceived intergroup harmony. We 
therefore recommend that researchers report effect sizes that express similarities to 
allow for a more balanced portrayal of research findings, especially if polarised 
groups are compared.  
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Figure 1. Anxiety levels of women and men. The top graph highlights the 
similarity between both distributions, the lower graph the differences.  
Note: To create the graphs, we used a scale ranging from 1 to 6 and a SD of 1 for both 
groups. 
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Figure 2. Stimuli used in Study 2. 
Note. SE: Standard Error, Feelings immigr.: Feelings towards immigrants. Both was spelled 
out in the graphs displayed to the participants. 
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Table 1 
Variables used in Study 1 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Human values (own) X X X 
Human values (perceived) X X  
Devolution X   
Need for Cognition  X  
British identity  X X 
Attitudes towards Brexit 
(‘manipulation check’) 
 X  
Income   X 
Education   X 
Prejudice   X 
Zero-sum beliefs   X 
Party Attachment 
Conservatives 
  X 
Party Attachment 
Labour 
  X 
Party Attachment 
Liberal Democrats 
  X 
Political interest   X 
Political views   X 
Sample size  940 440 126 
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Table 2 
Descriptive and inferential statistics along with effect sizes for Leavers vs 
Remainers comparisons in sample 1 
 Leave Remain     
 M SD M SD t p d PCR 
Security 4.68 1.05 4.43 1.08 3.66 <.001 0.24 91 
Tradition 4.17 1.03 3.91 1.13 3.65 <.001 0.24 91 
Conformity 4.02 1.15 3.80 1.19 2.85 .005 0.19 93 
Benevolence 4.67 0.97 4.75 0.94 -1.30 .195 -0.08 97 
Universalism 4.38 0.93 4.68 0.85 -5.06 <.001 -0.33 87 
Self-direction 4.30 1.00 4.24 1.02 0.79 .430 0.05 98 
Stimulation 3.31 1.22 3.51 1.24 -2.50 .013 -0.16 94 
Hedonism 3.54 1.12 3.71 1.15 -2.25 .025 -0.15 94 
Achievement 3.37 1.20 3.50 1.23 -1.65 .099 -0.11 96 
Power 2.74 1.11 2.78 1.10 -0.58 .561 -0.04 98 
Security_o 4.23 1.07 4.19 1.01 0.62 .534 0.04 98 
Tradition_o 3.43 1.09 3.37 1.03 0.76 .450 0.05 98 
Conformity_o 3.25 1.15 3.17 1.07 1.16 .245 0.08 97 
Benevolence_o 4.02 1.11 4.11 1.03 -1.36 .175 -0.09 96 
Universalism_o 3.55 1.06 3.61 1.07 -0.81 .418 -0.05 98 
Self_direction_o 3.96 1.02 3.98 1.01 -0.33 .743 -0.02 99 
Stimulation_o 3.76 1.03 3.82 1.06 -0.96 .337 -0.06 98 
Hedonism_o 4.23 1.06 4.35 0.98 -1.73 .084 -0.11 96 
Achievement_o 3.80 1.01 3.89 0.99 -1.36 .173 -0.09 96 
Power_o 3.49 1.12 3.58 1.02 -1.22 .224 -0.08 97 
Devolution 3.46 0.94 3.76 0.82 -5.24 <.001 -0.34 86 
Note. d: Cohen’s d, PCR: Percentage of Common Responses, _o: others (perceived values).  
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Table 3 
Descriptive and inferential statistics along with effect sizes for Leavers vs 
Remainers comparisons in sample 2 
 Leave Remain     
 M SD M SD t p d PCR 
Security 4.55 1.01 4.14 1.10 3.99 <.001 0.38 85 
Tradition 4.00 0.95 3.56 1.07 4.54 <.001 0.43 83 
Conformity 3.73 1.11 3.47 1.27 2.32 .021 0.22 91 
Benevolence 4.38 1.00 4.54 0.96 -1.68 .094 -0.16 93 
Universalism 4.14 0.95 4.63 0.90 -5.48 <.001 -0.54 79 
Self-direction 4.45 0.99 4.49 0.99 -0.42 .673 -0.04 98 
Stimulation 3.32 1.28 3.53 1.23 -1.70 .091 -0.17 93 
Hedonism 3.49 1.25 3.61 1.17 -0.97 .332 -0.10 96 
Achievement 3.53 1.25 3.64 1.22 -0.88 .381 -0.09 97 
Power 2.84 1.17 2.66 1.06 1.62 .107 0.16 94 
Security_o 4.71 0.92 4.72 0.91 -0.09 .930 -0.01 100 
Tradition_o 3.92 1.05 3.93 0.92 -0.06 .952 -0.01 100 
Conformity_o 3.85 1.03 3.97 0.99 -1.18 .239 -0.12 95 
Benevolence_o 4.24 0.99 4.21 0.81 0.33 .742 0.03 99 
Universalism_o 3.77 0.89 3.48 0.94 3.25 .001 0.31 88 
Self_direction_o 3.92 0.95 3.68 0.97 2.66 .008 0.26 90 
Stimulation_o 3.59 1.06 3.26 0.98 3.34 .001 0.33 87 
Hedonism_o 4.04 1.03 4.02 0.94 0.18 .859 0.02 99 
Achievement_o 4.07 0.97 4.09 0.90 -0.23 .819 -0.02 99 
Power_o 3.69 1.04 3.81 0.97 -1.21 .229 -0.12 95 
NFC 3.29 0.71 3.53 0.65 -3.68 <.001 -0.36 86 
British identity 5.58 1.27 4.97 1.36 4.81 <.001 0.46 82 
Brexit attitudes 2.30 1.39 5.69 1.09 -
26.29 
<.001 -2.77 17 
Note. d: Cohen’s d, PCR: Percentage of Common Responses, _o: others (perceived values), NFC: 
Need for Cognition. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive and inferential statistics along with effect sizes for Leavers vs 
Remainers comparisons in sample 3 
 Leave Remain     
 M SD M SD t p d PCR 
Security 4.46 1.22 4.25 1.18 0.97 .34 0.18 93 
Tradition 2.22 1.48 1.93 1.36 1.12 .27 0.20 92 
Conformity 4.38 1.37 3.97 1.41 1.61 .11 0.29 88 
Benevolence 4.36 1.19 4.82 0.98 -2.35 .020 -0.42 83 
Universalism 4.56 1.43 5.28 0.89 -3.47 .001 -0.62 76 
Self-direction 4.92 0.94 5.16 0.85 -1.47 .14 -0.27 89 
Stimulation 3.38 1.47 3.32 1.30 0.26 .80 0.04 98 
Hedonism 4.20 1.14 4.18 0.88 0.09 .93 0.02 99 
Achievement 3.34 1.36 3.32 1.42 0.10 .92 0.01 100 
Power 2.53 1.34 2.62 1.36 -0.36 .72 -0.07 97 
Income 6.79 2.96 7.40 3.38 -0.97 .33 -0.19 92 
Education 4.98 1.06 5.64 0.94 -3.66 <.001 -0.66 74 
British Identity 3.63 1.18 3.10 1.06 2.62 .010 0.47 81 
Prejudice 4.35 1.18 2.92 0.97 7.47 <.001 1.33 51 
Zero-sum beliefs 3.20 1.28 1.74 0.95 7.34 <.001 1.31 51 
Party Attachment 
Conservatives 
2.34 1.33 1.57 1.02 -3.68 <.001 0.66 74 
Party Attachment 
Labour 
1.80 1.16 2.61 1.28 -3.59 <.001 -0.66 74 
Party Attachment 
Liberal Democrats 
1.38 0.75 1.92 0.95 -3.39 <.001 -0.64 75 
Political interest 3.26 1.26 3.22 1.28 0.16 .88 0.03 99 
Political views 6.10 2.48 3.80 2.02 5.71 <.001 1.02 61 
Note. Higher scores on political views reflect more conservative than liberal views. Higher scores on 
emotions to election outcome reflect more positive emotions. d: Cohen’s d, PCR: Percentage of 
common responses.  
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Table 5 
Descriptive and inferential statistics along with effect sizes for similarity vs 
difference comparisons 
 Similarity Difference     
 M SD M SD t p d PCR 
Overall similarity 57.56 20.27 28.98 24.90 8.99 .0000 1.26 52.74 
Getting along 55.93 20.50 45.33 21.43 3.62 .0002 0.51 80.03 
Motivation to engage 55.22 30.58 50.11 27.75 1.26 .1049 0.17 93.04 
Evaluation of other 
group 
45.74 23.03 41.31 21.28 1.43 .0767 0.20 92.06 
Specific similarity 43.96 21.15 29.59 24.27 4.52 .0000 0.63 75.15 
Note. d: Cohen’s d, PCR: Percentage of common responses. p-values are based on directed 
hypotheses. 
 
